William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 11 (2002-2003)
Issue 3

Article 8

April 2003

The Modest Promise of Children's Relationship Rights
David D. Meyer

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Part of the Family Law Commons

Repository Citation
David D. Meyer, The Modest Promise of Children's Relationship Rights, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J.
1117 (2003), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol11/iss3/8
Copyright c 2003 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj

THE MODEST PROMISE OF CHILDREN'S
RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS
David D. Meyer'
Adults now have well-established constitutional rights to establish and maintain
vital family relationships. Children do not. A couple's decision to marry, a father's
love for his child, a grandmother's wish to share her home with her extended
family - all have been given special sanctuary from governmental interference by
the Constitution.' Yet, at least for now, the parallel yearnings of children for family
intimacy cannot claim the same constitutional protection. Although their interests
are often said to be all-important in non-constitutional family law and policy constituting a public concern of "the highest order"'2 - children occupy decidedly
shadowy ground in the constitutional law protecting family privacy.
Children occupy this position, it seems, not so much becausejudges are hostile
to their claims, but because judges don't know quite what to do with them within
the existing framework of American law. In fact, the courts have been fairly
receptive to claims for children's rights where the claims have seemed least
novel - in classic individual-versus-state conflicts, where the child was posed
directly against the coercive power of government. It was possible, for example, to
extend the privilege against self-incrimination, the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, or the bar against double jeopardy to juvenile proceedings
without seeming to unsettle basic social or legal assumptions.3 These guarantees,
like rights to free expression and fair process in public schools,4 could be seen as
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. I am grateful to the other
symposium participants who offered suggestions and comments on this Essay and especially
to Jim Dwyer for inviting me to take part.
See, e.g., Moore v. City of E.Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (addressing the right of
extended family to share a common household); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
(addressing the right of father to maintain ties with his children); Loving v. Virginia, 388

U.S. 1 (1967) (addressing the right to marry).
2 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (agreeing that "protect[ing] the interests
of minor children, particularly those of tender years," is, "of course, [a state interest].., of
the highest order").
3 See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (extending the bar against double
jeopardy to juvenile proceedings); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (extending the
reasonable doubt standard of proof); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,27-31 (1967) (extending the
right of self-incrimination); see also Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U.
CHI. L. REv. 39 (2003) (contending that the Court too readily adopted adult-modeled
procedural safeguards in the juvenile court system without adequately tailoring the

guarantees to the realities of child clients).
4 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653 (1977) (involving a due process claim
against use of corporal punishment by school officials); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
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limiting directly only the powers of the state, and so could be debated and conferred
on apparently conventional terms. The suggestion that children might have rights
corresponding to those held by adults against state coercion and abuse was
essentially amendatory, not revolutionary.
The claim, however, that children might have their own constitutional rights of
privacy or autonomy within the family, corollary to those of adults, obviously
presents a different set of problem . Such a claim poses a direct challenge not only
to the power of the state, but also to the authority of parents, an authority that itself
is privileged by the Constitution. Faced with this quandary, courts have not
categorically rejected children's privacy rights, but have proceeded haltingly. In the
1970s, at a time when some scholars and activists were calling for children's
"liberation" through legal reform,6 the Supreme Court held that children do possess
their own privacy rights with respect to contraception and abortion, and
immediately confronted a tangle of vexing implications: Which children are
competent to assert their rights? On what basis should courts resolve conflicts
between a child's assertion of a right and her parent's assertion of childrearing
authority?7 As a result, for much of the quarter-century since, the courts have
largely retreated. Finding no satisfactory global answers to the potential intrafamily conflicts of interests, the courts have simply suppressed the confounding
questions posed by children's rights through tactical avoidance, such as by denying
appellate review or standing to assert claims in the first instance, or by willfully
presuming that children's privacy interests must be neatly aligned with those of
their parents.' The field of substantive due process protection is treacherous enough
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (recognizing a First Amendment right of
schoolchildren to wear armbands protesting the Vietnam War).
' This is not to say, of course, that the courts have extended these rights to children on
equal terms. To the contrary, where the courts have been willing to recognize the
constitutional claims of children, they generally have "made clear that the scope and
implementation of th[o]se rights ... may be conditioned in ways that they could not be
limited for adults." Lee E. Teitelbaum, Children'sRights and the Problem of EqualRespect,
27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 799, 815-16 (1999); accord Emily Buss, The Parental Rights of
Minors, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 785, 794 (2000) ("In every context in which the Supreme Court
has considered children's claims of constitutional rights, the Court has concluded that
children's minority justifies some curtailment of the adult right in question.").
6 See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, Abandoning Children to Their
Autonomy: The UnitedNations Convention on the Rights of the Child,37 HARV. INT'L L.J.
449, 453-54 (1996); Martha Minow, Children's Rights: Where We've Been, and Where
We're Going, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1573, 1575-78 (1995).
7 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (recognizing a minor's right to
seek judicial consent to an abortion as an alternate to parental consent); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (recognizing a minor's right of access to
contraception); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976) (recognizing a
minor's right to elect abortion).
' In case after case involving potential conflicts of interest between children and their
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in the view of most judges without the addition of yet more claimants with
potentially conflicting rights. And so it was possible by the 1990s for Martha
Minow to observe that "it ha[d] even become fashionable to make fun of [calls for
children's rights], and certainly to view them as misguided and counterproductive."9
Quite recently, however, there are signs that this ground might be shifting again.
Recent decisions by state and lower federal courts have held that children possess
their own constitutional rights to maintain important family relationships.' In
Troxel v. Granville," the Supreme Court's most recent foray into the field, two
Justices suggested that future claims of parental prerogative over child visitation
would need to be balanced against the competing privacy rights of children
themselves. Justice Stevens put it squarely:
While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature of a
child's liberty interests in preserving established familial or family-like
bonds, it seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and
parents, the Supreme Court has dodged the dilemma by simply assuming that the interests of
child and parent would be aligned in opposition to the state's intervention. See Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. i 10 (1989) (assuming that daughter and the man legally presumed to
be her father would share mutual interest in resisting contact with girl's biological father);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760-61 (1982) (assuming that child and parent would
both share similar interest in resisting state's petition to terminate parental rights); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,230-31 (1972) (assuming that parent and child would both concur
in opposing state enforcement of mandatory schooling); see also Emily Buss, "Parental"
Rights, 88 VA. L. REv. 635, 660-68 (2002) (questioning the Court's assumption in Michael
H.); Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53 (1999)
[hereinafter Buss, FriedaYoder] (questioning the Court's assumption in Yoder).
9 Minow, supranote 6, at 1575.
" See, e.g., Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 518 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing fundamental
"right of a child to be raised and nurtured by his parents"); Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235
F.3d 1000, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a child has a fundamental constitutional right
to preserve a relationship with her parent); In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 724 (Ct.
App. 2001) (recognizing that a child may have a constitutional right to maintain relationship
with adoptive parents); In re Guardianship of Zachary H., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7, 16-17 (Ct.
App. 1999) (holding that a child has a fundamental constitutional liberty interest in remaining

in the custody of non-parent caregivers); In re Harriett II, 740 N.Y.S.2d 162, 164-65 (App.
Div. 2002) (reserving judgment on whether trial court was correct in "holding that 'a child
has an independent, constitutionally guaranteed right to maintain contact with a person with
whom the child has developed a parent-like relationship'); Webster v. Ryan, 729 N.Y.S.2d
315, 316 (Fam. Ct. 2001) (holding that a child has a constitutional right to maintain

relationship with "parent-like" adult figures); Meldrum v. Novotny, 640 N.W.2d 460, 470
(S.D. 2002) (Konenkamp, J.concurring in part) ("Courts are beginning to recognize that 'a
child has an independent, constitutionally guaranteed right to maintain contact with a person
with whom the child has developed a parent-like relationship."') (quoting Webster, 729
N.Y.S.2d at 316).
" 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate
relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too, must
their interests be balanced in the equation.' 2
Justice Scalia agreed - though without Justice Stevens' apparent enthusiasm for
the enterprise - thatjudicial recognition of parents' privacy interests in the family
inevitably supports recognition of corresponding privacy interests on the part of
others in the family as well. 3 All of this suggests that courts may be readying
themselves at last to deal seriously with the knotty questions posed by the idea of
children's rights. "4
In this Essay, I evaluate the growing momentum toward the recognition of
children's independent constitutional rights of family privacy. I begin by
considering three broad categories of potential objections to this trend rooted both
in constitutional theory and in family policy. These concerns, I contend, warrant
caution in developing and extending the constitutional rights of children in this
context, but do not require their outright rejection. Instead, it seems to me that the
articulation of children's constitutional rights is justified even though it is likely to
be of limited utility. What is ultimately likely to be of most benefit to children,
however, is not doctrinal innovation to give them new "rights," but innovation in
the collection and dissemination of empirical knowledge about their developmental
needs. That knowledge would be vitally helpful in resolving the potential
objections to the idea of children's rights. Still more important, however, new
Id.at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
'
Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia wrote:
Judicial vindication of "parental rights" under a Constitution that does not even
mention them requires (as Justice Kennedy's opinion rightly points out) not only
a judicially crafted definition of parents, but also - unless, as no one believes,
the parental rights are to be absolute - judicially approved assessments of
"harm to the child" and judicially defined gradations of other persons
(grandparents, extended family, adoptive family in an adoption later found to be
invalid, long-term guardians, etc.) who may have some claim against the wishes
of the parents.
Id Justice Scalia offered this observation, of course, as a reason not to recognize a
fundamental childrearing right for parents, a contention rejected by all eight other members
of the Court.
" Beyond the interest in preserving family relationships, there is an emerging willingness
in other contexts as well to recognize that children may have their own individual
constitutional rights in opposition to the childrearing authority of their parents. See Buss,
Frieda Yoder, supra note 8 (considering assertion of a minor's right to religious liberty
independent of that of parents); Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Rightfor Mature Minors to
Receive Information, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223 (1999) (contending that under certain
conditions mature minors may have a constitutional right to receive information over parental
objections).
12
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empirical knowledge emanating both from the laboratory and from the lived
experience of family life in an increasingly diverse society is needed to build
stronger public consensus about the proper limits of parental rights.
I. THE PROBLEM OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS:
KEEPING DEMOCRACY, AND JUDGES, IN THEIR PLACE

There is a broad range of possible objections to the idea of giving children their
own independently enforceable constitutional rights within the family. The most
substantial of these, however, can be organized into three basic types: (1) that

recognizing independent privacy rights for children is incompatible with a desirable
theory of constitutional law; (2) that recognizing independent privacy rights for
children is incompatible with a desirable conception of family policy; and (3) that
recognizing independent privacy rights for children, even if somehow theoretically
justifiable, would simply introduce too many doctrinal imponderables to be useful

in the real world occupied by lawyers and judges.
In a sense, all of these objections might be seen as driven by concern for the
proper boundaries of democracy. Those who object on grounds of constitutional
theory worry that the movement toward children's rights entails an invasion by
politically unaccountable judges into a sphere that should be reserved for
democratic action; the others fear that the movement, by aspiring to give each
family member full constitutional identity and to enforce public norms of fairness
and equality, threatens an invasion of the ideals of democracy into a private sphere
where they have no place.
A. Theoretical Objections to the Source of Children'sConstitutionalRights

The most obvious concern about allowing children to claim constitutional
protection for their own sense of family is that the Constitution itself suggests no
such right. The objection here is related not to anything distinctive about family,
but to broader concerns about the proper role ofjudges in discerning and enforcing
limitations on our democratic government that are not reasonably suggested by the
text of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has overcome these objections, of course, in recognizing
other rights of family privacy. Notwithstanding the textual gymnastics of Griswold
3 initially ascribing constitutional protection for privacy
v. Connecticut,"
to the
"emanations" of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, 6 the Court in
recent decades has owned up to a privacy jurisprudence that has no real roots inthe
text of the Constitution. Yet, the theoretical justification for the judiciary's
.5
16

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 484.
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enforcement of non-textual rights remains famously contested.
The Court sometimes has insisted that the only legitimate basis for recognizing
constitutional rights outside the text is a deeply rooted societal consensus about the
outer limits of governmental power. Thus, in Griswold,the Court found protection
for marital privacy partly on the basis that marriage, by common understanding, has
long occupied a privileged, even "sacred" position in society somehow beyond the
controlling reach of government. 7 Likewise, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,"
Justice Powell explained that "the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition."' 9 And so a grandmother's decision to share her home with
extended relatives was constitutionally privileged because "[t]he tradition of uncles,
aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents
and children has roots [in social
custom] equally venerable and equally deserving
of constitutional recognition. ' " This search for external validation of non-textual
rights in historical practice is said to be necessary to the popular legitimacy of
judicial intervention by ensuring that judges are not simply imposing their own
value choices under the guise of the Constitution.2' This has led some judges to
deny constitutional privacy protection to children on the ground that society can
hardly be said to have long considered itself bound to respect children's own sense
of family.22 By this understanding of the courts' authority, these decisions surely
are correct. Indeed, Troxel itself indirectly proves the point. The Court's readiness
"7See id. at 485-86; id. at 487, 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (contending that marital
privacy is constitutionally protected because the value of freedom within marriage is deeply
rooted in the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people") (quoting Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)) (alteration in original).
1 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
'9 Id at 503.
20 Id. at 504.
2 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (explaining that the
attribution ofjudicial intervention to deeply rooted societal understandings helps to "assure
[the Court] and the public that announcing rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution's
text involves much more than the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the
States and the Federal Government"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (arguing that constitutional protection must be grounded in either
text or traditional societal consensus about the limits of governmental power in order to
ensure that, "[i]n determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to
decide cases in light of their personal and private notions").
2
See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302-03 (1993) (holding that alien children
subject to thejurisdiction of immigration authorities have no fundamental constitutional right
to be released to the custody of extended relatives rather than institutional caregivers);
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130-31 (1989) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.)
(holding that child born of an extramarital affair had no fundamental constitutional right to
a relationship with her biological father); Moe v. Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding that minors have no constitutional right to marry).
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there to lend state validation to a mother's wishes to scale back the relationship
between her daughters and their grandparents seems at odds with the suggestion that
23
society owes fidelity to children's own sense of family.
There is another theory of constitutional privacy that is plainly more amenable
to children's rights. In some cases, the Court has bottomed protection not on
tradition, but on a modem assessment of the private stakes in government action.
The Court has recognized a fundamental right of couples to marry across the color
line or while incarcerated,24 of unwed fathers to establish and maintain ties with
their children,25 of unmarried couples to use contraception,2 6 of women to choose
abortion. 27 None of these rights plausibly can claim veneration in society's deeply
rooted and widely shared sense of family life. To the contrary, states had long and
widely interfered with each of these intimate choices, making it impossible to find
a historical consensus that government had no business regulating the specific
practices at issue. 28 Nevertheless, the Court sustained the private claim in each of
these cases, grounding constitutional protection in the overarching moral claims of
the individuals to public respect - for instance, in the importance of marriage to
personal fulfillment, 29 or in the profound consequences for individuals of state
interference with decisions affecting procreation or childrearing. 0
23 1 am

not claiming here that the parent's wishes in Troxel actually conflicted with those
of her daughters. Rather, my point is only that the wishes of the Troxel children evidently
were not essential to the outcome of that case.
24 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (finding that an interracial couple had a
fundamental right to marry); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (finding that a prison
inmate had a fundamental right to marry).
2 E.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972).
26 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
27 Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113(1973).
28 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part) (acknowledging that the narrow "mode of historical analysis [advocated by Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion]... may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in this
area"); id. at 137-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 159-60 (1996) (discussing the impossibility ofreconciling the Court's
holding in Loving with a strict reliance on historical consensus in defining the boundaries of
fundamental privacy rights); Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the

Supreme Court: The Retreatfrom Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 83, 91-92 (1989)
(discussing the Court's inconsistent reliance on historical consensus).
29

See Loving, 388 U.S. at I1 (finding a fundamental right to marry on the ground that

"[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential

to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383
(1978) (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 11).
30 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (finding a fundamental right to abortion
based largely upon the profound "detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant

1124

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:1117

As yet, the Court has not resolved the tension between these competing
approaches. In 1992, in Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,3 the Court seemed to reject the strictest possible reliance on historical
consensus, insisting that "[n]either the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of
States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer
limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment
protects."32 Just five years later, however, the Court returned to emphasize the
relevance of history in Washington v. Glucksberg," finding no protection for
assisted suicide on the ground that no embedded societal consensus supported such
a right.34 Most recently; in Lawrence v. Texas," the Court again de-emphasized the
importance of historical consensus in extending privacy protection to the sexual
intimacy of same-sex couples. Indeed, it is perhaps not unfair to conclude that the
Court emphasizes the importance of historical consensus when it wishes to deny
constitutional protection and downplays it when it is otherwise inclined to extend
protection.36 If so, the Supreme Court's eventual willingness to embrace children's
independent relationship rights will surely have more to do with contemporary
policy assessments than with the historical record.
B. Policy Objections to the Constitutional"Liberation" of Children
A second set of objectors to the recognition of independent privacy rights for
children are concerned less with constitutional legitimacy than with a normative
vision of family. Many scholars have lamented generally the growth of "rights
discourse" in the context of family law on the ground that it encourages a focus on
individual entitlements rather than a sense of communal responsibility toward
others." Some have particularly objected to the move toward children's rights,
woman by denying this choice"); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,541
(1942) (finding a fundamental right to procreate on the ground that forced sterilization carries
the potential for "subtle, farreaching, and devastating effects," including the infliction of
"irreparable injury" on the individuals affected).
"' 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
32 Id. at 848.
13 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
" Id. at 721.
31 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
36 See David D. Meyer, The Paradoxof Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527,562-63
(2000) (reviewing the various ways in which the Supreme Court has seemed to manipulate
doctrine in the course of defining the boundaries of constitutional protection for family
privacy).
17

See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL

DISCOURSE 121-30 (1991); MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF
INTIMACY 135 (1993); Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood,98 YALE L.J. 293,

295-96 (1988); Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourseand Neonatal Euthanasia,76 CAL. L.
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however, either because they value parental autonomy as a superior good in itself
or, more commonly, because they view parental autonomy as a means of
maximizing the welfare of children.
Some have warned, for instance, that the constitutionalization of children's
associational claims is corrosive of the very nature of family by spurring
factionalization, encouraging children and parents "to think about their relationship
... in abstract legal terms and concepts that foster separation and boundaries." '
Margaret Brinig, for instance, has argued that by promoting judicially imposed
solutions, rather than informal mediation and nonlegal norms, the extension of
constitutional protection to children's relationships with "third parties" inevitably
"disrupts the intimacy and autonomy necessary for families... to thrive."" Others,
including Emily Buss and Elizabeth Scott, have focused directly upon the welfare
of children and contended that the impulse to aid children by arming them with
constitutional rights is likely to be self-defeating.4 For many parents, privacy including both the practical immunity from second-guessing and the public respect
for private competence which that immunity signifies - may be an essential
incentive to their full and unqualified investment in the hard work of parenting."'
Unqualified investment may well be vitally important to the bonding of parent and
child and, ultimately, to the child's optimal development and maturation.42
These are very substantial concerns. If the behavioral assumptions are correct,
this argument poses a direct challenge to the core justification for recognizing
children's rights - the notion that children's profound personal stakes in familyrelated disputes demand that they be given their own voice in any resolution. The
assumptions are certainly plausible, and available empirical evidence offers some
support. It seems clear, for instance, that substantial legal insecurity in the
relationship between children and their adult caregivers - at least when it relates
to doubts about the continuity of custody or future contact with the child - can
impair the quality of bonding.43 The risk that foster parents or prospective adoptive
parents may abruptly lose ties with a child if the child's parents should reassert an

REV. 151,157-58,164-65 (1988).
's Lynn D. Wardle, The Use andAbuse ofRights Rhetoric: The ConstitutionalRights of
Children, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 321, 337 (1996).
" Margaret F. Brinig, Troxel and the Limits of Community, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 733, 765
(2001) (footnotes omitted); see also REGAN, supranote 37.
40 See Emily Buss, Children's Associational Rights?: Why Less Is More, I I WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1101 (2003); Elizabeth S. Scott, ParentalAutonomy and Children's
Welfare, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1071 (2003).
4' See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert F. Scott, Parentsas Fiduciaries,81 VA. L. REv. 2401
(1995); see also Brinig, supra note 39, at 778-79.
42 See Scott, supra note 40.
41 See David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the ConstitutionalDilemmaof the Faultless
Father,41 ARIZ. L. REv. 753, 798-803 (1999).
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interest in custody undoubtedly leads some to temper their emotional investment in
order to protect themselves." Indeed, it may be that even the contingent prospect
of losing custody upon divorce causes some fathers to limit their investment in
childrearing during marriage."' Without doubt, there is considerable evidence that
impaired bonding detrimentally affects the welfare of children.46 Recently, for
example, Margaret Brinig and Steven Nock documented significant differences in
the well-being of children residing in foster and kinship care as opposed to those
living with adoptive parents, a gap they attributed in part to "a lack of trust by
participants [in the non-adoptive families] that the relationship will continue. 47
Yet the overall evidence seems inconclusive. First, although custodial
insecurity clearly can impair bonding with children, recognition of children's
relationship rights would not expose many parents to that degree of insecurity, Far
more often, recognition of children's rights would expose parents to lower-level
meddling by courts, forcing them, for example, to tolerate occasional visitation by
a former caregiving partner. It seems much less clear that this more modest hazard
would diminish the satisfactions of parenthood enough to compromise bonding.
Moreover, there are surely cross-currents here. An expansive conception of
parental childrearing privacy, unqualified by the countervailing rights of children,
no doubt impresses some parents with an awesome sense of responsibility and
inspires them to invest themselves in a manner worthy of this public reward. Yet
it surely strikes others as little more than validation of their "natural" dominion and
entitlement; for them, robust privacy rights operate not as a reward but as a
windfall. Therefore, determining whether children, on balance, are ultimately
benefitted requires an assessment not only of the relative numbers of each type of
parent but also of the respective detriments their children may suffer. For instance,
even if a robust conception of parental privacy is optimal for most children, it might
be that the benefit they derived from that optimization is relatively modest and more
44

See H. DAVID KIRK, SHARED FATE 10 (1964); ELINOR B. ROSENBERG,

THE ADOPTION

LIFE CYCLE 133 (1992); Lisa Belkin, NowAccepting Applicationsfor My Baby, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 58 (describing one couple's calculated "reserve" in caring
for their prospective adoptive child).
45See Margaret Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring
Theories, 73 IND. L.J. 393, 402-03 (1998); cf Scott & Scott, supra note 41, at 2450-5 1.
46 This is surely the least controversial supposition of attachment theory in the childdevelopment literature. See, e.g., VIRGINIA L.COLIN, HUMAN ATTACHMENT 96-97 (1996)
(discussing relationship between impaired parent-child bonding and manifestations ofanxiety
and insecurity on the part of children); Grant Charles & Jane Matheson, Children in Foster
Care:Issues ofSeparationandAttachment,2 COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES 37,39-40 (1990)
(observing that disruptions in attachments with caregivers is correlated with "anger and
related dysfunctional responses" on the part of children); Meyer, supranote 43, at 798-801
(surveying additional studies).
" Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, How Much Does Legal Status Matter?
Adoptions by Kin Caregivers,36 FAM. L.Q. 449, 467-69 (2002).
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than offset by the harm suffered by the minority of children whose parents take
privacy as a license to act selfishly.
C. Objections Based on DoctrinalFeasibility
Finally, the emergence of independent relationship rights for children might be
opposed on more pragmatic grounds. Even if it could be established that the
recognition of children's rights would not be directly inimical to democratic values
or to the flourishing of family bonds, the idea might still be thought simply
unworkable or unhelpful.
First, there is inevitably the problem of drawing lines. If parents and now
children can each claim constitutional protection for their substantial intimate
relationships, then why not countless "third-party" adults as well - grandparents,
step-parents, foster parents, aunts, longtime nannies, and so on?48
Second, recognizing multiple and potentially competing rights-holders simply
does not fit within established constitutional doctrine. Notwithstanding ongoing
murkiness in the Supreme Court's cases in this area,49 the standard account
continues to hold that state incursions on fundamental individual rights of privacy
trigger strict judicial scrutiny. Allowing the interjection of a new set of rightsholders, with sometimes conflicting demands upon state authority, would make
maintenance of that framework impossible. Consider, for instance, a case in which
a parent seeks to reclaim custody of a child who has been living for years with
substitute caregivers.5" Under conventional thinking, government denial of custody
to the parent would be a substantial burden on the parent's fundamental liberty and
This seemed to be partly the basis of Justice Scalia's reluctance to recognize even
parental rights in the context of visitation, though he had more foundational theoretical
objections as well. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92-93 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
"9See, e.g., Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: ParentalRights After Troxel v. Granville,
2000 SUP.CT. REV. 279; Naomi Cahn, Models of Family Privacy,67 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1225, 1231 (1999); David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family PrivacyAfter Troxel and
Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1125 (2001).
5 This was the scenario, for instance, in the cases of "Baby Richard," see In re Petition
of Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Il1.1995), and "Baby Jessica," see In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d
239 (Iowa 1992)- each of which spurred calls for the recognition of children's rights. See
Marcus T. Boccaccini & Eleanor Willemsen, ContestedAdoption and the Liberty Interest
ofthe Child, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 211 (1998); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The
ConstitutionalRight of Childrento MaintainRelationshipswith Parent-LikeIndividuals, 53
MD. L. REv. 358 (1994); Suellyn Scamecchia, A Child's Right to Protectionfrom Transfer
Trauma in a ContestedAdoption Case,2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 41 (1995); James G.
O'Keefe, Note, The Need to ConsiderChildren'sRights in BiologicalParentv. Third Party
Custody Disputes, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1077 (1991). For a fuller account of the legal
responses to the Baby Richard and Baby Jessica cases, see Meyer, supra note 43.
48
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therefore presumptively unconstitutional." Yet, if the child were also held to have
her own fundamental right to maintain family ties with her longtime caregivers, and
if that right were also protected by strict scrutiny, it would be presumptively
unconstitutional for the state to order a change of custody, leaving the court in a
potentially irreconcilable quandary.
Third, there is the vexing problem of conferring rights upon persons who may
typically be incompetent to assert them. Children's dependency on others to
articulate and represent their interests poses an obvious and basic dilemma for a
program that seeks to empower them independently of their parents, the state, and
other holders of power.
These concerns are indisputably weighty, but not necessarily insurmountable.
Certainly lines would need to be drawn, but that task does not seem obviously more
daunting here than in the context of other non-textual constitutional rights. If
children's relationship rights rested on judicial recognition of the substantiality of
the relationship and the profound consequences for them of its severance, then other
claimants seeking protection presumably would be required to make a similar
showing. There is good reason, moreover, to think that the consequences of
relationship disruption are not identical for children and adults and, therefore, that
extension of rights to others would not follow as a matter of course.
Likewise, significant doctrinal adjustments would indeed be required to account
for the addition of new rights-holders and for the inability of some children to make
the decisions necessary to assert those rights. But this, too, seems manageable.
First, the courts already are gaining substantial experience with the problems of
giving independent legal voice to children. As Barbara Woodhouse has observed:
The "children's attorney" is [of late] a common sight in modem family
courts and most judges now have the authority to appoint a lawyer to
represent the child in complex cases where it appears that a child's rights
are at risk or that parents cannot sufficiently represent the child's
interests. 2
Many scholars and lawyers recently have given thoughtful attention to the
developmental and ethical dilemmas posed by this undertaking.3 Although certain
51 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §

10.2.2, at 648 (1997) (concluding that"[tihe Supreme Court has recognized that parents have
a fundamental right to custody of their children," and that deprivations of custody must
therefore pass strict scrutiny).
52 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Status of Children's Rights: A Story of Emerging
Rights, in CROSS-CURRENTS:

FAMILY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES

423, 436

(John Eekelaar et al. eds., 2000).
"' See, e.g., Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of
Child Clients, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 895 (1999); Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to
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difficulties are surely inherent in the independent representation of children's
interests, it can be expected that the rapidly growing practice of representing
children in custody, visitation, abuse and neglect cases will yield greater confidence
that the challenges are surmountable. Second, the adjustments needed to account
for the creation of a new class of rights-holders in the privacy context would not be
as transformative as the standard account supposes. As the Justices themselves
seem increasingly willing to acknowledge, the potential for conflicting interests
within the family already has exerted pressure on traditional doctrine, whether or
not all of these various interests are denominated as "rights."54 This pressure has
created an awkward and unevenjurisprudence in which conflicting privacy interests
are sometimes openly balanced (as in the case of minors' abortion rights) and
sometimes accommodated sub silento." Therefore, to the extent that recognizing
children's rights requires the formal abandonment of the strict-scrutiny formula, the
burden of revision would fall more heavily on hornbook authors than on the Court's
actual mode of analysis. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, frank acknowledgment
by the Court that the standard strict-scrutiny framework is inapplicable in familyprivacy disputes would be desirable without regard for whether the Court also

recognized independent privacy rights for children.

6

Moreover, there are alternative doctrinal models that would help to bring more
order to the courts' accommodation of intersecting constitutional rights. One
possibility might be a loose analogy to the way in which the Court has sought to
find balance between the respective constitutional powers of the President and
Congress. In the Steel Seizure Case," Justice Jackson famously suggested a threepart test for reviewing assertions of inherent presidential authority, in which judicial
deference to executive action depends in part on whether the action conflicts or
Voice: Appointing Counsel for Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571
(1 996). See generally Symposium, Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children,
64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1281 (1996).
14 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sandra
Day O'Connor, The Supreme Court and the Family, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 575-76
(2001). As Justice O'Connor recently observed,
While constitutional due process doctrine is primarily concerned with the
relationship of individuals to the State, the resolution of family disputes focuses
primarily on the relationship of individuals with each other. In family cases, the
rights of individuals are intertwined, and the family itself has a collective
personality. Thus, the due process model may not be the best framework for
resolving multi-party conflicts where children, parents, professionals, and the
State all have conflicting interests.
Id (footnote omitted).
" See generally Meyer, supra note 49 (discussing the Court's balancing of conflicting
interests in Troxel and Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)).
56 See Meyer, supra note 49; Meyer, supra note 36.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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coincides with the independent assertions of legislative prerogative. 8 When
Congress expressly concurs in the President's assertion of power, Justice Jackson
wrote, the Court should almost always defer.59 At the other extreme, "[w]hen the
President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress,
his power is at its lowest ebb," and judicial deference should be minimal.' In
between, when Congress has been silent or ambiguous about the presidential action,
lies "a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority,
or in which its distribution is uncertain."6 In such cases, Justice Jackson wrote, the
best that courts can do is to proceed pragmatically, case-by-case, with results
usually turning "on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables
rather than on abstract theories of law. 62
It might be possible to import something like this framework to legal disputes
over family relationships. Where parent and child clearly concur with respect to the
preservation or destruction of a relationship, state deference should be maximal.63
On the other hand, where a parent's control of a relationship is unambiguously
resisted by the child, state deference to the parent's prerogative should be notably
weaker. In the "twilight zone" will lie a substantial number of cases in which the
child's own assertion of interests cannot be reliably ascertained. The reasons for
"silence" will be different, of course, for a child than for Congress. With respect
to Congress, ambiguity often is the product of collective action problems and the
difficulty of interpreting inaction6; with respect to children, "silence" concerning
a disputed relationship may come either from a child's failure to speak or from the
unreliability of an immature child's expression of self-interest. In either case, doubt
regarding the child's own wishes would warrant some diminution of the substantial
deference owed parental judgment, though exactly how much probably cannot be
reduced to a bright-line rule. Instead, given the complexity and diversity of family
relationships, the balance would hinge on "the imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables."65
Id.
at 635-39 (Jackson, J., concurring).
9 Id.
at 635-37.
'0Id.
at 637.
61 Id.
62

Id.

As Barbara Woodhouse has noted, "[w]hen the interests of parents and children
coincide, as in the original education cases, endowing the family patriarch or matriarch with
autonomy from state intervention empowers all family members." Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Child Abuse, the Constitution,and the Legacy ofPierce v. Society of Sisters,
78 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 479, 484 (2001); see also Meyer, supra note 36, at 580-87
(contending that degree of unity or fracture within family should be relevant to determining
the extent of deference owed by courts to parental prerogative).
4 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, InterpretingLegislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67
(1988).
65 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
63
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As far afield as this analogy might seem, the framework it suggests actually
seems quite compatible with the Court's recent decision in Troxel v. Granville. In
that case, a majority of Justices signaled agreement that a parent's constitutional
authority to terminate a child's other relationships depends in part upon an
assessment of the child's own wishes and needs.' To be sure, Troxel did not hold
that children possess independent constitutional rights in the matter, and made
emphatically clear that courts owe substantial deference to a parent's assessment
of her child's best interests.67 Nevertheless, the notion that the deference due
parents is variable and depends in part upon the child's concurrence with or
hostility toward the parents' judgment is fundamentally consistent with Justice
Jackson's approach. And the Justices' evident determination in Troxel to steer a
pragmatic course with respect to family relationships, shunning strict scrutiny and
other bright-line rules in favor of case-by-case adjudication, seems almost
consciously reminiscent of Justice Jackson's prescription for pragmatic, "twilight
zone" review."
None of this is to say, of course, that a framework along these lines would
render the judicial resolution of relational disputes determinate and predictable.
Plainly, it would not. But it could at least cabin the realm of indeterminacy and give
trial judges some signals about how to balance the competing interests.
II. THE VALUE OF "CONSTITUTIONALIZING" CHILDREN'S INTERESTS

So far, I have sought mainly to show that there are no conclusive reasons to
reject the trend toward recognizing constitutional relationship rights for children.
I have tried to suggest a workable doctrinal approach through which courts might
sensibly balance respect for the rights of both children and their parents. But I have
only indirectly tried to explain what affirmatively would be gained by this
maneuver. As I explain below, I believe there would be value, although I am also
prepared to concede that it would be relatively modest.
Few today deny that children's interests are important and ought to be a
substantial consideration in legal decisions significantly affecting them. This
consensus can be seen readily in the common resort to the "best interests of the
child" in laws governing custody, visitation, termination of parental rights, and
' See Buss, supranote 49; Stephen Gilles, Parental(and Grandparental)Rights After
Troxel v. Granville, 9 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 69 (2001); Meyer, supranote 49, at 1141-46,
1152-53.
67 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000) (suggesting that courts must give
"special weight" to a parent's own assessment of her child's best interests in deciding
whether to grant visitation over the parent's objection).
68 See David D. Meyer, Constitutional Pragmatismfor a Changing American Family,
32 RUTGERS L.J. 711, 722 (2001) (contending that "[a]bove all else, the Justices in Troxel
embraced a quintessentially pragmatic approach to the dilemma of family privacy").
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adoption.6 9 But it also can be seen within the established constitutional law of
family privacy. Indeed, part of my argument for the feasibility of integrating
children's rights into family privacy doctrine rested on the observation that existing
doctrine already balances parental prerogative against children's relational interests.
Even the most ardent advocates of parents' rights generally agree, for instance, that
a parent's prerogative to control a child's contacts must yield to a child's interest
in avoiding the infliction of serious harm.7" Consequently, it is not obvious what
would be gained by giving children's interests the legal status of rights. After all,
as the Court's experience with parental rights shows, recognizing a child's "right"
to maintain a relationship with a non-parent caregiver, sibling, or other important
intimate would not mean that the child was conclusively entitled to preserve that
relationship; it would still be necessary to balance the child's claim against the
competing claims of her parents to control her contacts with others.
Theoretically, at least, transforming children's "interests" into "rights" would
change nothing of substance. Certainly, the reformulation would not necessarily
elevate the degree of judicial protection now afforded children's "interests." As
Troxel demonstrates, there is no basis for expecting that constitutionalization would
bring with it the heightened protection of strict scrutiny. The problem of
intersecting interests within the family already has effected the de facto
abandonment of that standard in the context of family privacy. And children would
have even less reason to expect aggressive scrutiny. Even when children's interests
do not obviously conflict with those of parents or other family members, courts
generally have held that children's "rights" are entitled only to a qualified form of
constitutional protection. 7 Thus, simply labeling children's interests as rights
would not, of itself, necessarily alter the balancing process that already occurs.
Whether the law provides that a parent's fundamental right of childrearing
autonomy is qualified by the public interest in averting harm to children, or instead
See generally James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in State
Decision Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 845 (2003). This
is not to say, of course, that children's interests are the exclusive, or even the dominant,
consideration in each of these contexts. As James Dwyer persuasively demonstrates, legal
decisions affecting children often are shaped by the interests of others, even when the
governing law purports to focus exclusively on children's interests. See id. My point is only
that, in most relevant contexts, legal decisionmakers at least claim to regard children's
interests as an important consideration.
70 See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Brooks v. Parkerson, 454
S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995); Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 300 (Me. 2000); Hoff v. Berg,
595 N.W.2d 285, 290 (N.D. 1999); In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 38-30 (Wash.
1998), aff'd sub nom. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
" E.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(reviewing Supreme Court cases and concluding thatjuvenile curfew laws burdening minors'
fundamental rights of travel are subject only to intermediate judicial scrutiny); see also
Teitelbaum, supra note 5, at 814-16.
69
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that a parent's childrearing right must be balanced against a child's own right to
maintain important relationships, the outcome will depend ultimately upon the
court's substantive assessment of the competing family interests.
I do not mean to suggest that the transformation of children's interests into
constitutional rights would make no difference. In a substantial number of cases,
it would make all the difference if the law classified children's relational interests
as rights, even if the tipping point at which those interests prevailed over parental
prerogative remained fixed at avoiding serious harm to children or some other preexisting formulation. Recognizing a constitutional right held by children would
help ensure children's standing to bring claims, filling in crucial gaps in current
law.72 Armed with their own rights, children would no longer be dependent upon
the government to choose to assert its parenspatriaeinterest on their behalf; they
could assert their interests when government was otherwise distracted or indifferent
(although practical difficulties in arranging private representation would, of course,
remain).
Moreover, it seems plausible that recognizing children's rights would change
the outcome of the courts' balancing in at least some cases, even without formally
altering the substantive standard of decision. Under current law, courts often are
inclined to discount claims of harm to children.73 The interests of parents, the only
disputants armed with a constitutional right, generally are given much more
credence. Judges, after all, understand legal rights; they are sometimes quite
skeptical about the social science that underlies claims of psychological harm. If
society is truly agreed that avoiding harm to children is a worthy counterweight to
parents' childrearing liberty, the most reliable and effective way of ensuring that
child harm is taken seriously may be to give it the designation of a legal right.74
For these reasons, recognizing a child's independent right to maintain important
relationships under the Constitution would have real value in a number of cases and,
in my view, is worth its costs. And yet, I am not sanguine that this doctrinal change

72

See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Children'sRights, in HANDBOOK OF YOUTH AND

JUSTICE 377, 396-98 (Susan 0. White ed., 2001).
" See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-CenteredPerspective
on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1809-10 (1993) (analyzing cases favoring

the claims of genetic over "gestational" parents and concluding that, "[a]lthough giving lip
service to children's interests, they fail to reflect children's experience of reality"); Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Childas Property,

33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1116-17 (1992) (contending that the Supreme Court "has
shown a disturbing willingness to deny the child's reality in order to protect a hollow family
integrity").
71 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Outof Children'sNeeds, Children'sRights ": The
Child's Voice in Definingthe Family,8 BYU J. PUB. L. 321, 339 (1994) (suggesting that "[a]
discourse of children's rights might do a better job.., by shifting [judges' focus] away from
justice between adults and stressing instead the needs-based right of... children").
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would protect all, or even most, children who are now failed by our court system.
Although some judges might be coaxed by the constitutionalization of children's
interests to overcome their reluctance to find child harm, many others would not.
My own sense, after reading too manyjudicial opinions expressing sunny optimism
about children's natural resiliency in the face of grievous emotional lOSS, 7 is that
the greatest obstacle tojustice for children is not constitutional doctrine so much as
a failure of consensus to care deeply about the welfare of children. In this sense,
I believe that parent-focused constitutional doctrine often serves as cover, rather
than cause, for many decisions subordinating children's welfare. Adjusting the
doctrine, therefore, might eliminate that cover, but would not require abandonment
of the underlying pblicy intuition which exalts the prerogatives of parents over the
emotional needs of children.
Recent experience in Europe with the recognition of children's rights helps to
illustrate my point. Traditionally, French law has recognized the right of women
to refuse the legal status of motherhood after giving birth to a child. If a woman
asserts this right, known as accouchementsous X, she is recorded simply as "X" on
the child's birth certificate and her identity will remain an inviolable secret, even
to the child.76 This privilege to avoid family status might be thought inconsistent
with the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child and with the European
Convention on Human Rights. Article 8 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of
the Child, after all, guarantees "the right of the child to preserve his or her identity,
...including family relations," and Article 7 specifically recognizes the right of
every child, "as far as possible, . . . to know and be cared for by his parents."
Similarly, though less specifically, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights broadly declares that "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and
family life."
These declarations of children's rights did indeed spur debate over the practice
of anonymous motherhood in the French National Assembly, but the outcome was
to reinforce, rather than to abandon, the customary option for women to spurn
maternity. In 1993, the French Civil Code was amended to specify, through Article
341-1, the right of a woman to insist that "her identity shall remain secret"
following childbirth." According to Katherine O'Donovan, this was accomplished
in part by recharacterizing "the right of giving birth anonymously [a]s a
fundamentalfreedom" - an essential aspect of a woman's autonomy.78 And, in
71 See

Meyer, supra note 49, at 1139-40 & nn.74-75 (collecting cases).
76 See Odivre v. France, App. No. 42326/98, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
15-17 (Feb. 13, 2003),
available at http://www.stemipark.de/oeffentlichkeit/presse/2003/februar/urteil_engl.pdf
(describing French law); Katherine O'Donovan, ConstructionsofMaternityandMotherhood
in Stories of Lost Children, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD LAW 67, 74-75 (Jo
Bridgeman & Daniel Monk eds., 2000).
" Odi~vre, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
15.
78 See O'Donovan, supra note 76, at 79 (emphasis added).
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February 2003, the European Court of Human Rights upheld the French law against
the claim that it contravened Article 8 of the European Convention." The Court
agreed that Article 8's prohibition against state interference with "private and
family life" included protection for the right of persons to know the circumstances
of their birth and family origin."0 But it also observed that the child's right to know
his or her origins clashed with other protected individual rights, including those of
the birth mother and, potentially, the birth father, the adoptive parents, and "other
members of the natural family."'" The Court then concluded that the French
legislation struck a permissible balance between the competing individual interests
in the family.82
In effect, then, the recognition in European law of a child's "rights" in the
matter simply spurred the elevation of women's interests into countervailing
"rights," without affecting the pre-existing balance of interests struck by French
law. 3 Of course, Article 7 of the U.N. Convention itself seemed to anticipate this
possibility by asserting that a child has a right to know his or her parents only "as
far as possible." Similarly, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
expressly acknowledges that the individual's right to family privacy is qualified by
the need to "protect[] the rights and freedoms of others." In short, there is simply
no getting around the need to balance any concern for children with society's
respect for the familial interests and prerogatives of adults, and the French
experience with anonymous motherhood suggests that the balance point does not
so much depend on the introduction of rights-analysis as it does on independent
factors shaping social consensus about the nature of family and how competing
conceptions of family life should be prioritized. 4
" See Odibvre, Eur. Ct. H.R.
80 See id. 28-29.
81 See id 44.
82 See id.49.
83 This outcome seems consistent with Barbara Woodhouse's observation that U.S.
ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child would not require dramatic
changes to existing U.S. family law, because nominally more expansive Convention
guarantees concerning a child's "best interests" could be construed in a way that would be
consistent with "American constitutional principles providing greater protection to family
relationships." Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 5 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 313, 318
(1998). As Katherine O'Donovan noted about the differing responses of France and England
to the Convention on the question of child abandonment and anonymous motherhood,
"[w]here two jurisdictions are subject to the same international convention, history and
culture will lead to different interpretations." O'Donovan, supra note 76, at 82.
" Two British scholars reached essentially the same conclusion in considering whether
Article 8's recognition of family rights might change the outcome in disputes over
grandparent visitation in English courts. Although the interest in preserving substantial
established relationships between grandparents and grandchildren may well fall within
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Accordingly, children's best hope may lie ultimately not with lawyers, but with
social scientists and activists who might be able to gather the evidence necessary
to muster a consensus to strike that balance differently. More evidence about the
psychological and developmental stakes for children in the preservation of family
or family-like bonds could help propel a new public judgment about the appropriate
limits of parental choice in childrearing. It is ultimately that judgment-edifying
not judges alone, but also legislators, public administrators, social workers,
counselors, and parents themselves - that will do the real work of protecting the
welfare of children.
CONCLUSION

Recently, The New York Times reported the story of a father in Afghanistan
who, facing the prospect of starvation for his large family, made the desperate
decision to sell two of his ten children. 5 The two boys, five and ten years old, were
bought by a restauranteur in a nearby village and taken there to live and work for
him, under very harsh conditions. Although the boys understandably expressed
deep sorrow over their predicament in private, the restauranteur seemed oblivious
to their anguish, reassuring the reporter that if the boys felt lonely, he would allow
them to see their father every six months. Indeed, the purchaser boasted that this
was a pareto-superior transaction: The boys were fed at the restaurant; the father
received wheat to feed his remaining family; and the restaurant owner profited
because it was cheaper to purchase the boys' servitude than to hire employees for
wages. In fact, according to the restauranteur, the terms had been more generous
than necessary. The father, he said, had been willing to part with the boys for
nothing, just to see that they were fed. But, the purchaser added, "I know about
human rights. I knew I was obligated to pay him something." 6
The agonizing facts of this story are mercifully alien and extreme from the
perspective of modem America, and yet the story seems to capture the basic
dilemma of children's rights. On the one hand, it demonstrates the strongest
imperative for recognizing children's rights - that children not be regarded as
solely the subjects of adult transactions. Utterly missing from the purchaser's
account of the transaction was any sense at all of the children's enormous loss.
Article 8's protected scope, as incorporated into English law through the Human Rights Act
of 1998, the authors concluded that "new rights are likely to do little to change the domestic
legal landscape in relation to private law contact disputes.... [R]ights will not necessarily
'trump' prevailing constructions of welfare which place the child's best interests within the
nuclear family under parental control." Felicity Kaganas & Christine Piper, Grandparents
and Contact: 'Rights v Welfare' Revisited, 15 INT'L J.L., POL'Y & FAM. 250, 250 (2001).
Barry Bearak, A Nation Challenged: Survival; Children as Barter in aFamished Land,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2002, at A1.
86
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Recognizing the right of children to maintain vital family relationships would
correct this glaring omission, requiring consideration of the children's sorrow. On
the other hand, though, the story also illustrates the ultimate limitations on the
promise of children's rights. After all, pronouncing legal rights would do nothing
whatsoever for these boys absent some infusion of resources to address their
family's terrible need. If they would otherwise starve, they probably are better off
working in the restaurant and sleeping with the sheep.
That is essentially where I come out on the idea of children's relationship rights
under American constitutional law. I find their call almost ineluctable, although I
frankly doubt that they will go very far, by themselves, toward promoting the
welfare of children. Recognizing children's rights would be useful in eliminating
some of the procedural and tactical obstacles that now occasionally impedejudicial
consideration of children's interests. The denomination of children's associational
interests as rights might lead some judges to give greater credence to the emotional
losses suffered by children when important familial bonds are severed. But of even
greater value to children would be an infusion of new resources in the form of
knowledge and understanding that might build a stronger commitment to child
welfare outside the courtroom, in the legislature, the classroom, and the home.

